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Abstract
Existing models of R&D are not easily reconciled with four observable aspects
of R&D: initial technologies (“ideas”) need to be developed further, only a minor-
ity of initial ideas is successfully brought to the market, production and process
innovations take place simultaneously (whereby, initially, there is no production at
all), and process innovations are implemented for technologies that are destined to
leave the market. We present a detailed bifurcation analysis for a dynamic model of
R&D that captures these observations in one, unifying framework. As we provide a
global analysis, we do not limit initial technologies to carry marginal costs that are
below the choke price. We show that there always exists a critical value of initial
marginal cost above which the firm does not initiate any (R&D) activity; the path
to the saddle-point steady state is never globally optimal. We also sketch some
tentative policy implications of our analysis.
Keywords: Bifurcations, Innovation, Monopoly, Optimal control, R&D
JEL: D42, L12, O31
1 Introduction
Around 1900, Swiss chemist Jacques E. Brandenberger invented a transparent film
which he named “cellophane”. On December 26, 1923, American chemical company
DuPont acquired from La Cellophane Socie´te´ Anonyme, an organization to which
Brandenberger had assigned his various patents, the exclusive rights to its United States
cellophane patents. DuPont’s hopes for creating a lucrative market were shattered,
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however, by discovering that cellophane could not be used to wrap up products that
require moisture proofing, such as cake and candy. It took DuPont chemist William H.
Charch three years and thousands of tests to develop a lacquer that made cellophane
moisture proof, an invention that revolutionized the packaging and merchandizing
industry. As the manufacturing costs of cellophane continued to decline due to DuPont’s
ongoing process innovations, so did the price of cellophane. All this contributed to
cellophane being used as wrapping material for a variety of products (from food to
jewelry), and for its use in various products (including batteries, scotch tape, and dialysis
machines). Since the mid-1930’s, cellophane has been manufactured continuously. It is
still used today.
The development of cellophane, from mind to market, is typical for the life cycle of
many new technologies. Research starts long before a prototype sees the light of day;
development begins long before the launch of a new product. Ideas abound, but only
a small fraction of these ideas leads to successful innovations. For instance, in 1979,
Apple was enthusiastic about a design for a computer mouse that they had discovered at
Xerox research center. But Apple did not develop this prototype further as the projected
production costs of a single mouse would be over $400.1 Also, existing technologies
tend to leave markets slowly due to incumbents’ R&D efforts. For example, Edison’s
invention of an electric light bulb was bound to replace the gas lamp. Producers of the
latter however prolonged the lifetime of this inferior technology through continuous
product innovations, including the introduction of the Welsbach mantle that made gas
lamps five times more efficient (Utterback, 1994).
These examples illustrate four stylized facts of R&D: (i) initial technologies (“ideas”
or “prototypes”) need to be developed before they are suitable for large-scale production;
(ii) there are many initial technologies, but only a very limited fraction is developed
further, and from this fraction only a subset will constitute a successful innovation, (iii)
production and the search for further improvements take place simultaneously, and (iv)
there are process innovations for technologies that are destined to leave the market in
the foreseeable future.
1Years later, Apple came up with a new design which would only cost $25 to produce. This prototype
was subsequently developed into Apple’s famous single-button mouse.
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Existing models of R&D are not easily reconciled with these observations. Static
models of R&D are silent about the process from prototype to the first release of new
products and production technologies.2 Moreover, these models are forced to assume
that marginal costs, the proxy for production technologies, are below the choke price
(the lowest price at which the quantity sold is zero). This assumption is unlikely to hold
for new technologies in their early stages of development.
Dynamic models of R&D are in principle equipped to capture the path from pro-
totype to market penetration. To date, however, neither “innovation race” models nor
dynamic versions of static models do so adequately. In essence, models of innovation
races examine the time of completion of a cost-saving innovation of known magnitude,
whereby the expected time of completion has a one-to-one relationship with R&D
expenditures.3 These models exclude the coexistence of production and R&D efforts.
Moreover, the R&D process cannot fail, thus transforming the R&D investment decision
into a static one. Dynamic versions of static R&D models maintain the assumption
that marginal costs are below the choke price at all times.4 Initial technologies that are
“expensive” are excluded, by assumption, from the analysis. Hence, R&D efforts always
lead to the stable equilibrium. Put differently, every initial technology will be developed
further, and successfully so. Indeed, without exception this literature provides analyses
that are only locally optimal.
In this paper, we provide a general description of the economics of R&D. In particu-
lar, for any initial technology level c0, we characterize the investment and production
path that is globally optimal for a monopolist. Hence, we do not exclude initial tech-
nologies with marginal costs above the choke price, and we do not restrict ourselves to
solutions that are only locally optimal.5 Our model is, therefore, more easily reconciled
with the four stylized facts of R&D mentioned earlier.6
2The seminal papers in this literature are d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992);
see De Bondt (1997) for an overview.
3Seminal contributions here include Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980). Reinganum (1989) surveys
this literature.
4This literature is still scant; it includes Cellini and Lambertini (2009), Lambertini and Mantovani (2009),
and Kova´cˇ et al. (2010).
5As it turns out, a non-trivial part of the parameter space yields stable paths with initial marginal costs so
high that production would yield negative mark-ups. At that stage all the monopolist does is to invest in R&D
in order to bring down the costs of production.
6As this is the first analysis ever to consider the entire range of initial technologies, we restrict ourselves
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From a technical point of view, the problem of the monopolist is formulated as
an optimal control problem with an infinite time horizon. Its distinctive characteristic
is the presence of multiple equilibria while at the same time the Arrow-Mangasarian
sufficiency conditions are not met. In models of this type, the qualitative properties of
optimal solutions may change if parameters are varied. We therefore use bifurcation
analysis7, which constitutes the mathematics of a qualitative change, to assess industry
dynamics for all initial technologies in conjunction with other parameter combinations
(including time preferences and the efficiency of the R&D process).
Our analysis yields four distinct scenarios, three of which remain hidden in local
analyses: (i) initial marginal costs are above the choke price and the R&D process is
initiated; after some time production starts and marginal costs fall with subsequent R&D
investments; (ii) initial marginal costs are above the choke price and the R&D process is
not initiated, yielding no production at all; (iii) initial marginal costs are below the choke
price and the R&D process is initiated; production starts immediately and marginal costs
fall over time, and (iv) initial marginal costs are below the choke price and the R&D
process is progressively scaled down; production starts immediately but the technology
(and production) dies out over time; the firm leaves the market. The strength of our
analysis is that all these cases can emerge from the same unifying framework.
Our analysis is not without policy implications. It shows that market characteristics
that affect future profitability have an impact on the monopolist’s decision to further
develop an initial technology. If market regulations are such that future mark-ups are
reduced a priori, it could be that the range of initial technologies that is developed
further will shrink. The loss of total surplus this reduction brings about constitutes a
hidden cost of market regulations if the initial technology consists of marginal costs
above the choke price. In that case, there is no immediate production lost if the initial
technology is not developed further. Yet, these indirect costs should be taken into
account when assessing properly the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency.
to the monopoly case. Obviously, competitive forces play an important role as well in what we observe about
R&D.
7Variations in parameter values can lead to qualitative changes in the solution structure (e.g., some steady
states lose their stability, indifference points appear, and so on). Such qualitative changes in the solution
structure due to smooth variations in parameters are called bifurcations (see Grass et al., 2008).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in the next
section and its steady states are characterized in Section 3. The properties of the global
equilibrium and corresponding industry dynamics are considered in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
Time t is continuous: t ∈ [0,∞). A single supplier produces at marginal costs c(t). At
every instant, market demand equals production
q(t) = A− p(t), (1)
where p(t) is the market price, q(t) is the quantity produced, and A is the choke price.
The monopolist starts with an initial, exogenous technology c(0) = c0. He can reduce
this marginal cost by exerting R&D effort k(t). Marginal cost evolve over time:8
dc(t)
dt
≡ c˙(t) = c(t) (−k(t) + δ) , (2)
8One interpretation of the model is that c0 constitutes the initial level of technology corresponding to a
product innovation which is then followed by subsequent process innovations. This idea can be traced back to
the pioneering work by Abernathy and Utterback (1975, 1978). Lambertini and Mantovani (2009) consider a
multiproduct monopolist that simultaneously pursues process and product innovations. They show that the
path to the saddle-point steady state involves some substitutability between the two innovation types.
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where δ > 0 is the constant rate of efficiency reduction due to the ageing of technology
and organizational forgetting.9 The cost of R&D efforts per unit of time is given by:
Γ(k(t)) = bk(t)2, (3)
where b > 0 is inversely related to the cost-efficiency of the R&D process. Hence, the
R&D process exhibits decreasing returns to scale.10 The monopolist discounts the future
with the constant rate ρ > 0.
Instantaneous profit is:
pi(q, k, c) = (A− q − c)q − bk2, (4)
yielding total discounted profit:
Π(q, k, c) =
∫ ∞
0
pi(q, k, c)e−ρtdt. (5)
The optimal control problem for the monopolist is to find controls q∗ and k∗ that
maximize the profit functional Π subject to the state equation (2), the initial condition
9In assuming a positive rate of technology (or know-how) depreciation we follow the related theoretical
literature (Besanko et al. (2010), Lambertini and Mantovani, 2009). For instance, in Besanko et al. (2010), a
firm moves down its learning curve if its gains in know-how through learning are less than the inevitable know-
how losses from organizational forgetting, inducing marginal costs to increase. Empirical documentation also
supports the assumption of a positive depreciation rate due to organizational forgetting (Benkard, 2004): “an
aircraft producer’s stock of production experience is constantly being eroded by turnover, lay offs and simple
losses of proficiency at seldom repeated tasks. When producers cut back output, this erosion can even outpace
learning, causing the stock of experience to decrease” (Benkard, 2004, p. 590). In our model, know-how
gains come from investments in R&D and not from production, but the main idea is the same. Furthermore,
production costs include complementary inputs that are typically purchased. Due to their inherent evolution
over time, it becomes ever more costly to incorporate them into the production process of a firm that is
sluggish in its R&D (e.g., installing a newer version of software on obsolete hardware can significantly
slow down performance). The reason for this is that R&D efforts not only generate new information within
the firm, but also determine the firm’s ‘absorptive capacity’ - “the firm’s ability to identify, assimilate, and
exploit knowledge from the environment” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, p. 569). Note that the equilibria for
a non-positive depreciation rate follow trivially. For δ is zero, consider δ very close to zero. Such a small
depreciation rate pushes the level of the initial technology that will not be developed further far beyond the
choke price as only minuscule investments are needed to reduce marginal costs over time. Indeed, for negative
δ, every initial technology will be developed further as there is an exogenous reduction in marginal costs over
time, yielding a steady state with no production costs.
10Again, we follow the literature with this assumption (see, e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
Kamien et al. (1992), or Qiu (1997)). The evidence is mixed however. Schwartzman (1976) for instance
documents significant economies of scale in R&D. But Madsen (2007) is unable to reject the hypothesis of
constant returns to scale in the number of patents applied for. Moreover, for the pharmaceutical industry,
Vernon and Gusen (1974) and Graves and Langowitz (1993) concludes that firms experience decreasing
returns to scale in R&D. And Adams and Griliches (1996) conclude that there are strong diseconomies of
scale in the production of scientific articles.
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c(0) = c0, and two control constraints which must hold at all times: q ≥ 0 and k ≥ 0.
Note that according to (2), if c0 > 0, then c(t) > 0 for all t. The set of all possible
states at each time t is given by c ∈ [0,∞).
The model has four parameters: A, b, δ, and ρ. The analysis can be simplified by
considering a rescaled version of the model which, as defined in Lemma 1, carries only
two parameters: φ and ρ˜. That is, rescaling the model translates the four-dimensional
parameter space into a two dimensional space.
Lemma 1. By choosing the units of t, q, c, and k appropriately, we can assume A = 1,
b = 1, and δ = 1. This yields the following, rescaled model:
p˜i(q˜, k˜, c˜) = (1− q˜ − c˜)q˜ − k˜2, (6)
Π˜(q˜, k˜, c˜) =
∫ ∞
0
p˜i(q˜, k˜, c˜)e−ρ˜t˜dt˜ (7)
˙˜c = c˜
(
1− φk˜
)
, c˜(0) = c˜0, c˜ ∈ [0,∞)∀ t˜ ∈ [0,∞) (8)
q˜ ≥ 0, k˜ ≥ 0 (9)
ρ˜ > 0, φ > 0 (10)
with conversion rules: q = Aq˜, c = Ac˜, k = A√
b
k˜, t = t˜δ , pi = A
2p˜i, φ = A
δ
√
b
, ρ = ρ˜δ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The rescaled model introduces a new parameter φ = A/(δ
√
b), which captures
the profit potential of a technology in hand: a higher (lower) A implies higher (lower)
potential sales revenue, a higher (lower) b implies that each unit of R&D effort costs
more (less), whereas a higher (lower) δ implies that each unit of R&D effort decreases
the marginal cost by less (more). Therefore, a higher (lower) φ corresponds to a higher
(lower) profit potential of a technology. For notational convenience, we henceforth omit
tildes.
To solve the dynamic optimization problem, we introduce the current-value Pontrya-
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gin function11
P (c, q, k, λ) = (1− q − c) q − k2 + λc (1− φk) , (11)
where λ is the current-value co-state variable. It measures the marginal worth of the
increment in the state c at time t when moving along the optimal path.12As the marginal
cost is a “bad”, we expect λ(t) ≤ 0 along optimal trajectories.
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle states that if the triple (c∗, q∗, k∗) is an optimal
solution, then there exists a function λ(t) such that c∗, q∗, k∗, and λ satisfy the following
conditions:
1.) q∗ and k∗ maximize the function P for each t:
P (c∗, q∗, k∗, λ) = max
(q,k)∈R2+
P (c∗, q, k, λ), (12)
2.) λ is a solution to the following co-state equation:
−∂P
∂c
= λ˙− ρλ ⇔ λ˙ = q + (ρ− 1 + φk)λ, (13)
which is evaluated along with the equation for the marginal cost
c˙ = c(1− φk) (14)
and the initial condition c(0) = c0.
Let q = Q(c, λ) and k = K(c, λ) solve the problem max(q,k) P (c, q, k, λ) for every
(c, λ). We define the current-value Hamilton function
H(c, λ) = P (c,Q(c, λ),K(c, λ), λ). (15)
The above necessary conditions (12)–(13) for an optimal solution are complemented by
11Also called pre-Hamilton or un-maximized Hamilton function.
12More precisely, it measures the marginal worth of the increment in c along all trajectories that satisfy
the necessary conditions for an optimal solution (specified in what follows), including Michel’s transversality
condition (16).
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two transversality conditions:13
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtH(c, λ) = 0 (16)
and
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλc = 0. (17)
If problem (12) has a solution, this solution necessarily satisfies the following
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for all t:
∂P
∂q
= 1− 2q − c ≤ 0, q ∂P
∂q
= 0, (18)
∂P
∂k
= −2k − φλc ≤ 0, k ∂P
∂k
= 0. (19)
Conditions (18) imply that either i) q = 0 and c ≥ 1 or ii) q > 0 and c < 1.14 In
particular:
q∗ =

(1− c)/2 if c < 1,
0 if c ≥ 1.
(20)
Conditions (19) imply that either i) k = 0 and ∂P∂k ≤ 0 (implying λ ≥ 0) or ii) k > 0
and ∂P∂k = 0. In particular:
k∗ =

−φ2λc if λ ≤ 0,
0 if λ > 0.
(21)
The above conditions for optimal production yields two regimes of the state-control
system. The first is characterized by positive production; in the second there is no
production.
13The necessity of (16), which can be restated as limt→∞ e−ρtΠ(c, λ) = 0 and allows exclusion of
non-optimal trajectories, was proven by Michel (1982). Kamihigashi (2001) proves the necessity of (17).
14Observe that in the non-rescaled model, the analogous condition for positive production is that
c(t) < A.
9
2.1 The system with positive production
In the region where c < 1, using (13), (14), (20), and (21), we obtain the following
optimal state and co-state dynamics:

c˙ = c
(
1 + 12φ
2λc
)
,
λ˙ = 12 (1− c) +
(
ρ− 1− 12φ2λc
)
λ,
(22)
where λ ≤ 0.15 Equation (21) depends on the co-state and state variable. Note that the
correspondence between k and λ is one-to-one if, and only if, λ ≤ 0, and that therefore
the system can be re-written in the state-control form.
Differentiate equation (21) with respect to time to obtain the dynamic equation
dk
dt
≡ k˙ = −φ
2
(
λ˙c+ λc˙
)
. (23)
Use (13) and (14) for λ˙ and c˙ respectively. Note that equation (21) also implies that
λ = −2k
φc
. (24)
Substitute this expression into (23), together with (22) and the expression for the optimal
output level (q = (1− c)/2), to obtain:
k˙ = ρk − φ
4
c(1− c). (25)
Hence, the system with positive production (c < 1) in the state-control form consists of
the following two differential equations:

k˙ = ρk − φ4 c(1− c),
c˙ = c (1− φk) .
(26)
15We show in Appendix F that optimal solution trajectories necessarily satisfy λ ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0,∞).
Therefore, the differential equations in the main text, valid for λ ≤ 0, are all one has to consider.
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2.2 The system with zero production
In the region c ≥ 1, substituting (13), (14), and (24) into (23) and imposing q = 0,
gives the following expression:
k˙ = ρk. (27)
Hence, the state-control system with zero production consists of the following two
differential equations: 
k˙ = ρk,
c˙ = c (1− φk) .
(28)
The state-co-state analogue is:

c˙ = c
(
1 + 12φ
2λc
)
,
λ˙ =
(
ρ− 1− 12φ2λc
)
λ.
(29)
The Hamilton function, obtained by substituting (21) and appropriate expressions
for q from (20) into the Pontryagin function (11), is given by
H(c, λ) =

1
4 (1− c)2 + 14φ2λ2c2 + λc if c ∈ [0, 1),
1
4φ
2λ2c2 + λc if c ∈ [1,∞),
(30)
where λ ≤ 0. The state-control analogue is then
H(c, k) =

1
4 (1− c)2 + k
(
k − 2φ
)
if c ∈ [0, 1),
k
(
k − 2φ
)
if c ∈ [1,∞),
(31)
where k ≥ 0.
3 Steady-state solutions
The steady-state solutions of (26) and (28) are obtained by imposing the stationarity
conditions k˙ = 0 and c˙ = 0.
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Lemma 2. The “no-production” state-control system (28) has no steady state in the
region where it is defined.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The result of the above lemma is intuitive as a steady state in the “no-production”
region would imply that a firm maintains positive R&D investments without ever selling
anything.
Consider now system (26). Imposing the stationarity condition k˙ = 0, we obtain
kM =
φ
4ρ
c(1− c) ≥ 0, ∀c ∈ [0, 1], (32)
where superscript M stands for Monopoly.16 Steady-state marginal cost follows from
inserting (32) into the state dynamics (14) and imposing the stationarity condition
c˙ = 0:
c˙ = c
(
1− φ
2
4ρ
c(1− c)
)
= 0. (33)
This yields:
cM = 0, cM =
1
2
± V, (34)
where
V =
1
2
√
1− 16ρ
φ2
. (35)
Observe that V is real if, and only if, φ ≥ 4√ρ, in which case V ∈ [0, 12 ) and
cM ∈ [0, 1). The solution to the system is summarized in Proposition 1 and is depicted
in Figure 1.
Proposition 1. If φ > 4√ρ, the state-control system with positive production (26) has
three steady states:
i) (cM , kM ) = (0, 0) is an unstable node,
16All steady-state values have superscript M .
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ii) (cM , kM ) =
(
1
2 + V,
1
φ
)
is either an unstable node or an unstable focus, and
iii) (cM , kM ) =
(
1
2 − V, 1φ
)
is a saddle-point steady state.
At φ = 4
√
ρ, a so-called “saddle-node bifurcation” occurs as the last two steady states
coincide and form a so-called “semi-stable” steady state.
If φ < 4
√
ρ, the state-control system with positive production has one single steady
state: the origin (cM , kM ) = (0, 0), which is unstable.
Proof. See Appendix C.
3 steady states
(c, k) = (0, 0) is the only 
steady state
SN
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
8
Ρ
Φ
Figure 1: Steady states of the state-control system. The saddle-node bifurcation (SN)
curve is defined by φ = 4
√
ρ. Passing through this curve from above, the two steady
states other than origin coincide, form a “semi-stable” steady state, and then disappear,
leaving only one steady state to exist.
The intuition for the condition φ > 4
√
ρ in the above proposition is that developing
a technology further becomes an option (the saddle-point steady state exists) only if for
a given discount rate, the profit potential of a considered technology is high enough.
In the saddle-point steady state, instantaneous marginal cost, output, and profits are,
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respectively:
cM =
1
2
− V, (36)
qM =
1
4
+
V
2
, (37)
piM =
1
16
(1 + 2V )
2 − 1
φ2
. (38)
3.1 Comparative statics
The relevant comparative statics are as follows:
Lemma 3. Steady-state marginal cost is increasing in b, δ, and ρ, and decreasing in φ;
steady-state quantity, profit, consumers’ surplus, and total surplus are decreasing in b,
δ, and ρ, and increasing in φ.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Recall that δ accounts for an exogenous decrease in production efficiency due to the
ageing of technology and organizational forgetting. The monopolist does not need to
exert the desired level of the R&D effort all at once but can smooth it over time. With a
convex R&D cost function this enables him to reduce his investment costs. The higher
the rate at which the technology depreciates, the less advantageous this smoothing will
be, as a larger part of what the monopolist has invested is lost at every next instant.
Further, in the steady state, the monopolist invests just enough to keep his marginal cost
constant at the desired level. Hence, the higher is δ, the more costly this maintenance
will be, as a larger part of the technology must be replaced in every period.
The higher is b, the more it costs a firm to implement a particular R&D effort at
every instant. As an increase in either δ or b makes implementing the desired R&D
effort level more costly, an increase (decrease) in b and/or δ increases (decreases) the
steady-state level of marginal cost and decreases (increases) the steady-state output,
profits and total surplus, as stated in Lemma 3 above.17
17Steady-state marginal cost in the non-rescaled model equals cM =
(
A−
√
A2 − 16bδρ
)
/2. See
Appendix D for the steady-state values of other variables of the non-rescaled model.
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4 Global optimality and industry dynamics
(bifurcations of optimal vector fields)
Thus far we have focused on the steady state. Obviously, the stable manifold of the
saddle-point steady state is one of the candidates for an optimal solution. However, as
the following remark shows, it may not (always) be the optimum.
Remark 1. The Pontryagin function of the optimization problem as given in (11) is not
jointly concave in the state and control variables. Hence, necessary conditions for an
optimum are not necessarily sufficient.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Therefore, we have to carry out a detailed bifurcation analysis to assess the depen-
dence of the solution structure on the model parameters.18,19 This yields a complete
overview of how optimal R&D investment and concomitant production respond to
changes in the initial level of marginal cost and to varying characteristics of the R&D
process. To analyze global optimality, we have to inspect the entire state-control space,
which is the set of solutions (c(t), k(t)) of the state-control system considered as pa-
rameterized curves (trajectories) in a plane. Its general form is sketched in Figure 2.
The dotted vertical line c = 1 separates the region with zero production from the
region with a positive level of production. In the left region, the parabola which achieves
its maximum at c = 1/2 is the locus k˙ = 0. The loci representing points where c˙ = 0
are the horizontal line k = 1/φ and the vertical line c = 0, which coincides with the
k-axis. Loci c˙ = 0 and k˙ = 0 intersect in the saddle-point steady state (S2) and the two
unstable steady states (S1 and S3). The black arrows in squares indicate the direction of
trajectories in each respective region. The horizontal arrows indicate an increase or a
decrease in c, whereas the vertical ones refer to changes in k. A number of trajectories
18For a recent discussion of the use of bifurcation theory in analyzing non-convex optimal control problems
with multiple equilibria, see Kiseleva and Wagener (2010).
19Note that Remark 1 applies to all related papers as well, including Lambertini and Mantovani (2009),
Cellini and Lambertini (2009), and Kova´cˇ et al. (2010). Without further analysis it remains unclear whether
these papers discuss truly optimal behavior. A sufficiency proof that does not rely on joint concavity of state
and control variables can be given by adapting the Stalford sufficiency theorem (Stalford, 1971) to an infinite
horizon setting, as, for instance, in Polasky et al. (2011).
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0 0.5 1 1.5
c
k
q > 0 q = 0
k˙ = 0
c˙ = 01
φ
L1
S3
S1
S2
L2
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Figure 2: Illustrative sketch of the state-control space.
is indicated by grey arrows. Together, the trajectories cover the entire space. However,
there are only two trajectories leading to the saddle-point steady state; these are called
“stable paths” or “stable manifolds”. They are indicated by the connected black arrows
pointing towards S2. The lighter arrows pointing away from S2 indicate the two unstable
paths. Trajectories spiral out from S3 in a counter-clockwise motion.
The solution to the state-control system (28), which yields trajectories in the region
with zero production, is given by:
k(t) = C1e
ρt, (39)
c(t) = C2e
(
t− eρtφC1ρ
)
, (40)
where C1 and C2 are positive real constants.
A solution to the state-control system (26), which yields trajectories in the region
with positive production, cannot be obtained analytically; we therefore make use of
geometrical-numerical techniques.20
A particular trajectory is a candidate for an optimal solution if it satisfies all nec-
20See also Judd (1998) and Wagener (2003). All numerical simulations were done in Matlab.
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essary conditions: those given by Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle together with
transversality conditions (16) and (17). As Figure 2 shows, there exists a whole range
of solutions (c(t), k(t)) to the state-control system. These trajectories all satisfy the
conditions of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle. By ruling out those trajectories that do
not satisfy the transversality conditions, we are left with the candidates for an optimal
solution.
Lemma 4. The points in Figure 2 in the set
{(c, k) : c ∈ (0, 1), k = 0}
cannot be a part of any optimal trajectory.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Lemma 5. All trajectories along which k →∞ and c→ 0 as t→∞ can be ruled out
as optimal solutions.
Proof. See Appendix G.
For instance, the trajectory denoted by L1 in Figure 2 is in the set of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6. The trajectory through the point (c, k) = (1, 0) satisfies the transversality
conditions (16) and (17).
Proof. See Appendix H.
In Figure 2, the trajectory of Lemma 6 is labeled L3. We call this the “exit trajectory”
as it implies that the firm (eventually) exits the market. Indeed, at some stage the exit
trajectory enters the region where c ≥ 1, at which point both R&D investment and
production come to a halt.21
Notice that the stable path (denoted by L2 in Figure 2) to the saddle-point steady
state (S2) also satisfies the transversality conditions. Notably, along this trajectory, both
c and k converge to finite limits and, therefore, so does the co-state variable (24).
21Strictly speaking, the firm’s marginal cost continues to increase along the exit trajectory due to the
positive depreciation rate δ. However, we interpret any situation in which the firm stays inactive as one in
which it has left the market.
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As the following corollary to the above lemmas shows, we are left with two candi-
dates for an optimal solution.
Corollary 1. The set of candidates for an optimal solution consists of the stable path of
the saddle-point steady state and the trajectory through the point (c, k) = (1, 0).
Proof. See Appendix I.
To find an optimal solution from the candidates, we make use of the following
lemma.
Lemma 7. If the triple (c(·), q(·), k(·)) satisfies the necessary conditions (12)–(17),
then
Π(c(0), q(0), k(0)) =
∫ ∞
0
pi(q, k, c)e−ρtdt
=
1
ρ
P (c(0), q(0), k(0), λ(0))
=
1
ρ
H (c(0), k(0)) , (41)
where H is the Hamilton function in state-control form.
Proof. See, e.g., Grass et al. (2008), ch. 3, pp. 161–162.
Lemma 7 is useful whenever several paths satisfy all the necessary conditions for
an optimal solution and we have to determine which one yields the highest discounted
profit flow and is thus optimal. According to Lemma 7, these flows are equal to the
rescaled values of the Hamiltonian (31) at the corresponding initial points. That is, for a
given initial technology c(0), Lemma 7 enables us to determine a firm’s total discounted
profits when it decides to follow the stable path (Π1) and when it decides to follow the
exit trajectory (Π2). The option with the largest profits is then an optimal solution.
A short additional remark about profits is in order. Note that as a consequence of
Lemma 4, no optimal trajectory can enter the region {(c, k) |H(c, k) < 0}. For we
know that the investment schedule k(t) = 0 for all t will always result in nonnegative
profits, implying a fortiori that H(c, k) ≥ 0 on any optimal trajectory. In other words,
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following from Lemma 7, the present value of profits along any optimal trajectory is
always nonnegative.
Figure 3 provides an example in which the optimal solution is the stable path leading
to the saddle-point steady state. Note that the initial marginal costs can be higher than
c = 1. In that case, the optimal decision leads the firm to first produce nothing but to
invest increasingly in the reduction of its marginal costs. When marginal costs are below
one, it starts producing. The level of R&D investments then gradually decreases to its
long-run steady-state level. This is exactly the scenario behind the story of cellophane.22
Note that having a phase of zero production as a part of the stable path is possible
only if the range of initial marginal cost is not bounded to be below the choke price. In
this phase instantaneous profits are negative, but total discounted profits are positive;
the monopolist invests in R&D because once marginal cost is below the choke price,
production becomes profitable.23
In the example of Figure 3, the monopolist optimally selects an appropriate k
such that (c0, k0) is located on the stable path. However, as the Arrow-Mangasarian
sufficiency conditions are not satisfied (see Remark 1), not every investment policy
that follows the stable path is necessarily optimal. For a technology with a sufficiently
high initial marginal cost c0, it can be optimal for a firm to abstain from development,
as investing along the stable path would lead to a loss. That is, the solution structure
depends on the system’s parameters.
Figure 4 presents the bifurcation diagram, which shows the optimal R&D invest-
ments for varying parameter values.24 Every combination of the exogenous parameters
yields a point on this diagram. It consists of five distinct regions, each representing
a particular structure of the set of optimal solutions. In general, either there exists an
upper bound of initial marginal cost below which the monopolist selects the stable path
22Another example is the petrochemical industry. Stobaugh (1988) finds that R&D efforts aimed at process
innovations increase every year in the period following the initial product innovation, only to decrease again
after that. He also documents that the probability of the next process innovation being major is decreasing
over time.
23Related, the literature on optimal technology adoption predicts a substantial time lag between the
discovery of a new technology and its adoption (see, e.g., Hoppe (2002) for an overview). Delaying the
adoption provides additional information as to the profitability of a new technology; it is also rational if a
better technology is expected to become available in the near future (see also Doraszelski (2004)). In this
literature, however, technological progress is exogenous.
24The bifurcation diagram in Figure 4 is drawn for the parameters of the non-rescaled model.
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Figure 3: State-control space (a), time paths for quantity (b), marginal cost (c), and
R&D effort (d), the correlation diagram between the total discounted profit and marginal
cost (e), respectively. All plots show curves for parameter values (ρ, φ) = (1, 8).
towards the saddle-point steady state, or the (new) technology is always phased out by a
firm (eventually) exiting the market. Hence, if it exists, convergence to the saddle-point
steady state along the stable path is only locally optimal; it is never globally optimal.
In other words, if at all, investing in reducing marginal costs is only optimal for some
sufficiently small initial marginal costs, but never for all possible initial marginal costs.
Solutions to the optimization problem for parameters outside the shaded region in
Figure 4 are characterized by the presence of threshold values; the stable path of the
saddle-point steady state is optimal if the initial marginal cost is below some threshold
level, otherwise the exit trajectory is optimal. The threshold point can be either an
indifference point25 or a repeller. Indifference points are initial states c = c0 for which
the firm is indifferent between several possible investment policies (i.e., the stable path
and the exit trajectory). A repeller differs from an indifference point in that at a repelling
point, it is optimal to stay at that point forever after.26
25Also called Skiba points or DNSS points (see Grass et al. (2008)).
26More formally, a threshold point separates two basins of attraction: the initial values of the marginal
cost below these points constitute the basin of attraction of the saddle-point steady-state; the initial values of
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram. The uppermost curve represents parameter values for
which the indifference point between the stable path and the exit trajectory is exactly at
c = 1. SN stands for the “saddle-node bifurcation curve”, SN’ for the “inessential saddle-
node bifurcation curve”, IA for the “indifference-attractor bifurcation curve”, and IR for
the “indifference-repeller bifurcation curve”. ISN indicates the “indifference-saddle-
node point”, which is the point from which indifference-attractor, indifference-repeller,
saddle-node and inessential saddle-node curves emanate. Its coordinates are ρ˜ ≈ 2.14
and φ ≈ 5.85. Roman numerals (I-V) indicate the corresponding parameter regions
discussed in the main text. The shaded region (regions IV and V) indicates the parameter
region for which the firm always exits the market. Notice that the axes are excluded
from the admissible parameter space. The curve representing indifference points at
c = 1 obtains a value of φ ≈ 2.00 for ρ˜ = 1× 10−5.
4.1 Region I
In Region I, the point of indifference is above one. Therefore, the system will converge
to the saddle-point steady state for all initial technologies c0 ∈ (0, 1].27 A typical
example is depicted in Figure 5. The arrows indicate the direction of motion along
optimal trajectories. The two regions (production, no production) are split by the dotted
vertical line c = 1. For a given ρ, Region I is characterized by a relatively high φ,
that is, by relatively large demand and/or high R&D efficiency. In such a favorable
the marginal cost above these points constitute the basin of attraction to exit the market. An indifference point
lies in both basins of attractions, a repeller in neither.
27Note that c0 = 0 corresponds to an unstable steady state; for this trivial value of the marginal cost, the
monopolist stays at that point forever.
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Figure 5: State-control space and the total profit function when the indifference point is
in the region with zero production. The plots are drawn for parameter values (ρ, φ) =
(1, 8).
environment, the monopolist can compensate for his early stage losses if, initially,
production is postponed as that would yield negative mark-ups. There exists, however, a
finite upper bound cˆ > 1 for the initial marginal costs c0 beyond which future profits are
not enough to compensate for short-run losses (cˆ ≈ 1.49 in the case considered). In
that case, the initial technology will not be developed further. In Figure 5, the point of
indifference (indicated by a dashed vertical line) occurs where the total profit function
for the stable path (Π1) in the right-hand picture obtains a value of zero (which is the
value of the total profit function for the exit trajectory Π2 in the region c ≥ 1). As the
total profit beyond this point is negative (the firm makes a net loss), the firm prefers not
to invest at all. Starting from any initial value of marginal cost below the indifference
point, the firm’s optimal decision is to follow the stable path. The exact position of the
indifference point is defined in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. If an indifference point between the stable path and the exit trajectory exists
in the region with zero production (c ≥ 1), it is given by the value of the marginal cost
cˆ ≥ 1 for which the point (c, k) =
(
cˆ, 2φ
)
lies on the stable path. For c0 = cˆ, total
discounted profits are zero for both trajectories.
Proof. See Appendix J.
Observe that in Figure 5, the indifference point cˆ ≈ 1.49 corresponds to the value of
k = 2/φ = 0.25 on the stable path, as implied by Lemma 8. For this value of k, the
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Figure 6: State-control space and the total profit functions when the indifference point
is on the boundary between the two regions (cˆ = 1). The plots are drawn for parameter
values (ρ, φ) = (1, 6.655).
Hamilton function (31) obtains a value of zero and, therefore, by Lemma 7, the total
discounted profits (Π1) are zero as well (see the right plot in Figure 5). For c > cˆ, the
value of k on the stable path is smaller than 2/φ and so the total profits are negative;
whereas for 1 ≤ c < cˆ, the value of k on the stable path is larger than 2/φ and so the
total profits are positive.
Region I is bounded from below by the curve for which the point of indifference
is at c = 1. This particular situation is depicted in Figure 6: for all initial values of
the marginal cost c0 ∈ (0, 1), the optimal-solution trajectory is the stable path of the
saddle-point steady state, while for c0 ∈ (1,∞), it is optimal not to produce and to
invest anything; at c0 = cˆ = 1, either strategy is optimal. The right-hand picture shows
that the total profit Π1 for the stable path is zero at c = 1. For comparison, the total
profit Π2 on the exit trajectory, which passes through the point (c, k) = (1, 0), is plotted
up to its conjugate point (the last point on the trajectory where marginal cost is still
decreasing; see also footnote 30 below).
The stable path in the region with zero production (c ≥ 1) is characterized by a
decreasing k and an increasing c as t → −∞ (see (39)–(40) and Figure 5). From
Lemma 8 follows that the indifference point between the stable path and the exit
trajectory is at c = 1 when the stable path reaches k = 2/φ at c = 1 (see Figure 6).
As investment is increasing in φ (for a given ρ), we can find for every ρ a high enough
φ such that the indifference point is either at c = 1 or in the region with c ≥ 1. A
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Figure 7: Dependence of the indifference point cˆ on the model parameters. Curves are
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and/or δ increases the value of marginal cost at the indifference point, and vice versa.
This effect is larger, the smaller the value of ρ. An increase in ρ reduces the critical
value of marginal cost, ceteris paribus.
higher φ for a given ρ in Region I moves the indifference point further beyond c = 1.
Consequently, Region I is not bounded from the right. Moreover, as k decreases along
the stable path as t→ −∞, at some instant the stable path, having a value of k at c = 1
above k = 2/φ, reaches the point with k = 2/φ for some c > 1 as t→ −∞. Therefore,
for parameters in Region I, we always have an indifference point at some c = cˆ ≥ 1 and,
in particular, the convergence to the saddle-point steady-state is for these parameters
guaranteed if c0 ∈ (0, 1], but not for all c0 ∈ (1,∞).
Figure 7 illustrates how the indifference point varies with the parameters.28 Clearly,
for a given discount rate ρ, the more efficient is the R&D process, the larger will be
the range of initial marginal costs that lead the monopolist to select the stable path.
Likewise, a higher choke price corresponds to a higher value of initial marginal cost at
the indifference point.
28Figure 7 is drawn for the parameters of the non-rescaled model.
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Figure 8: State-control space and the total profit functions when the indifference point
is within the region with positive production. The plots are drawn for parameter values
(ρ, φ) = (1, 5). The optimal-solution trajectories are marked by thick lines. The two
candidates for the optimal solution, which both spiral out of the unstable steady state
S3, are the stable path and the exit trajectory.
4.2 Regions II and III
In Region II, the indifference point cˆ is below c = 1. This implies in particular that at
the indifference point the monopolist produces a positive quantity. Figure 8 illustrates
this case. The indifference point occurs where the two respective total profit functions
intersect, as indicated in the right-hand picture. For the particular parameter values
considered in Figure 8, the indifference point occurs at cˆ ≈ 0.61. Although it is also
profitable to invest in R&D for some initial technology level c0 ∈ (cˆ, 1), the technology
is not promising enough for the monopolist to select the stable path towards the saddle-
point steady-state. Rather, he invests in R&D at some smaller rate that retards the decay
of the technology level optimally; but eventually the technology will leave the market,
and the monopolist with it.29
For an even higher initial level of marginal cost (c0 ≥ 1), the monopolist does not
initiate any activity; the new technology is not developed at all and the monopolist does
not enter the market.30
29An alternative possibility is that the marginal cost is bounded from above (e.g., by its initial level). Such
a state constraint is straightforward to implement. When a limit value of c is above the choke price, the result
is not changed as the exit trajectory enters the zero production region at the same instant as before. However,
when a limit value is below the choke price, a different scenario evolves: once the firm has reached the limit
value of c, it stops investing in R&D, but it continues to produce a positive amount. We thank an anonymous
referee for making us aware of this alternative possibility.
30Conjugate points P1 and P2 indicate the last element on the respective trajectory (when starting from
its end) where the marginal cost is still increasing/decreasing. Considering a particular trajectory beyond this
point would give us two possible k-points for each c, of which the one beyond the P point is suboptimal.
Observe that in the plot of the profits, the value of the total profit for the exit trajectory (starting from its end)
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Figure 9: State-control space and the total profit functions when there is a repeller point
(cR) in the region with positive production. The plots are drawn for parameter values
(ρ, φ) = (4, 8.2). The stable path of the saddle-point steady state and the exit trajectory
both flow out of a repelling point, which is the unstable node S3 (corresponding to
c = 0.6098).
Utterback (1994) documents several examples of technologies where process in-
novations continue to be realized although it is known that these technologies will
leave the market in the near future. For instance, steam-powered saws and conveyors
were first used in the ice harvesting industry after the introduction of machine-made
ice. And self-setting shutters, small plate cameras, and celluloid substitutes for glass
were introduced in the dry plate photography at the time that Kodak introduced roll
film cameras. These examples correspond well to the scenario predicted by the “exit
trajectory”.31
Region III is similar to Region II in that for c0 ≥ 1 the firm does not initiate any
activity and only for sufficiently low initial marginal costs c0 ∈ (0, cR) is there conver-
gence to the saddle-point steady state. There is, however, a small qualitative difference
between the two regions: in Region III, the threshold point is not an indifference point
but a repeller (see Figure 9). Starting close to the repeller, the firm will “linger” near
to it for a long time before deciding on developing the technology (if c0 < cR), or on
phasing it out eventually (if c0 > cR).32
Region III is separated from Region II by a type-2 indifference-repeller bifurcation
increases all along the way to P2 (where it obtains a cusp point), beyond which it starts decreasing.
31Note that if c0 ∈ (cˆ, 1), the alternative strategy of producing but not investing anything in R&D, which
corresponds to “following” the c-axis below the exit trajectory in Figure 8, yields lower total discounted
profits than following the exit trajectory (recall Lemma 4).
32Observe in Figure 9 that in the case of a repeller, the two trajectories never occur at the same time.
Hence, the corresponding total profit functions (the right-hand picture) do not intersect.
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√
ρ), the exit trajectory covers the whole space and it is the
only solution. Observe that the total discounted profit is positive for c < 1.
curve (IR1(2)), at which a repeller changes into an indifference point.33 Fixing φ and
varying ρ, it can be shown that the exit trajectory of a repeller lies below that of an
indifference point.34 This is also intuitive: a lower discount rate ρ (in the case of an
indifference point) implies larger investments in R&D as the monopolist values future
profits relatively more. Hence, for each initial value of marginal cost, the exit trajectory
corresponding to a lower discount rate lies above the exit trajectory corresponding to a
higher discount rate.
4.3 Regions IV and V
Region IV is separated from Region III by a saddle-node bifurcation curve, given by
φ = 4
√
ρ. This curve represents parameter combinations for which the saddle and the
unstable node S3 coincide and form a semi-stable steady state. After the bifurcation,
both the saddle and the unstable node disappear. In such a case (see Figure 10), the only
solution left is the exit trajectory: for c0 ≥ 1 the firm never initiates any activity, while
for c0 ∈ (0, 1) the firm does invest in R&D but it will leave the market at some future
instant. This is again intuitive as in Region IV we have that φ is relatively small (for a
33Before the bifurcation (Region II), the unstable steady state (S3) has two complex eigenvalues with
positive real parts. The stable path and the exit trajectory both spiral out from it, which yields an indifference
point to the left of the unstable steady state (focus). At the bifurcation, both eigenvalues become real and equal,
such that all trajectories move away from the unstable steady state in the direction of a unique eigenvector.
After the bifurcation, the steady state has two real positive eigenvalues and two corresponding (and distinct)
eigenvectors.
34Fixing ρ and varying φ leads to the same conclusion.
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given ρ). That is, R&D is relatively inefficient and/or market demand is relatively small.
Note that in Figure 10, R&D investments are initially increasing over time for very low
values of marginal costs. These investments reduce the pace at which the monopolist
will leave the market; for low initial marginal cost it is profitable to slow down this
process in order to profit optimally from the relatively favorable initial technology.
Finally, Region V resembles Region IV in that only the exit trajectory is optimal
(see Figure 11). This is in spite of the fact that points in Region V have higher φ values
than points in Region IV with the same value of ρ, and that the saddle-point steady
state (S2) together with its stable path (denoted by T1) exists. A distinctive feature of
Region V is that the exit trajectory (denoted by T2) intersects the vertical line through
the saddle-point steady state. Whenever this is the case, it is never optimal to be at the
saddle, or to follow any stable path leading towards it. Rather, the exit trajectory is
optimal, yielding a higher discounted profit flow: that is, the value of the Hamiltonian at
any point of the exit trajectory is higher than at points with the same value of marginal
cost on the stable path.35
Observe that in the upper right graph of Figure 11 total discounted profit evaluated
along the stable path (Π1) is always below that evaluated along the exit trajectory (Π2).
For the sake of completeness, the second stable path (denoted by T4) and the unstable
path (denoted by T3) are plotted jointly with the corresponding total discounted profit
functions (Π4 and Π3, respectively). The latter are also both lower than Π2. Therefore,
as said, for parameter values in Region V, the exit trajectory is always optimal and the
saddle-point steady state is never approached, neither from above nor from below.36 Put
differently, the saddle-point steady state is not even locally optimal.
The IA1 curve that bounds Region V from above is an indifference-attractor bifurca-
tion curve. At the IA1 bifurcation (depicted in the second row of Figure 11), the exit
trajectory (T2) coincides with the unstable path (T3) and yields a higher total discounted
profit than the stable path converging to the saddle-point steady state from the right (see
35This follows from the fact that the derivative of the Hamilton function with respect to k is negative for
k < 1/φ (which is also the k-coordinate of the saddle-point steady state).
36The second stable path is not drawn in the previous figures so as not to blur the exposition. The policy
that it induces implies that the long-run optimal marginal cost is just higher than the initial value of the
marginal cost.
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Figure 11: State-control space and the total profit functions before and at the indifference-
attractor bifurcation. The plots in the upper two graphs (before the bifurcation) are
drawn for (ρ, φ) = (0.5, 3.1). The plots in the lower two graphs show that the bifurca-
tion occurs at (ρ, φ) ≈ (0.5, 3.32).
also Kiseleva and Wagener (2011) and Wagener (2003)). Hence, there is no convergence
to the saddle from above. However, the exit trajectory does not intersect with any
vertical line in the region to the left of the saddle-point steady state. Consequently, the
left-hand stable path remains the only candidate for an optimal solution. That is, for
initial marginal cost lower than the saddle-point steady-state value, the optimal trajectory
approaches the saddle-point steady state from below.37
All in all, before the bifurcation, the exit trajectory lies below the unstable path of
the saddle; after the bifurcation, it lies above it. At the bifurcation, the two trajectories
change their relative positions, the saddle-point steady state becomes locally optimal
and an indifference point is created. That is, we enter Region II. In other words,
moving from Region V, where the firm always exits the market, by increasing φ while
keeping ρ fixed, we arrive at Region II, where staying in the market might be an optimal
37Notice that for the values of initial marginal cost lower than the saddle-point steady state, the saddle is
also approached from below for parameter values in Regions I, II, and III as the left-hand stable path of the
saddle point remains the only candidate for the optimal solution in the respective region.
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solution, depending on the initial level c0 of the marginal cost. The interpretation
is straightforward: staying in the market becomes an option if R&D becomes more
efficient and/or if market demand increases.
The curve bounding Region V from below is an inessential saddle-node bifurcation
curve (SN′1). It is similar to the SN1 curve in that two new steady states appear when
crossing it. However, it is inessential for the optimization problem: the bifurcation does
not entail a qualitative change of the optimal strategy, as the steady states involved in the
SN′1 bifurcation are not associated with the optimal strategy; as above, the exit trajectory
below the unstable path of the saddle remains the optimal trajectory. Consequently,
while the state-control system does bifurcate, the structure of the optimal solutions does
not.
Together, Region IV and Region V represent the parameter region for which there
is never convergence to the saddle-point steady state because it is either not optimal to
approach it (Region V) or because there is no saddle-point steady state at all (Region
IV).38
4.4 Unexpected changes in the parameters
Note that our model is deterministic in the sense that the monopolist does not form
expectations about possible changes in exogenous parameters. One interpretation of this
implicit assumption is that the monopolist is confronted, in fact, with great uncertainty:
even the probability distributions over exogenous parameters are unknown. Alternatively,
the implicit assumption is that the monopolist does not expect any change in the value
of any exogenous parameter. Whatever the underlying motivation, in this section
we illustrate that unexpected changes in exogenous parameters are straightforward to
implement in our framework.39
Utterback (1994) documents how producers of some of today’s widely-used con-
38Cellini and Lambertini (2009) restrict the values of the marginal cost to c ∈ [0, 1] and assume that the
saddle-point steady state is always optimally approached. Clearly, their conclusions hold only for parameters
in Region I as only there we have convergence to the steady state for initial marginal costs c ∈ (0, 1]. A look
at Figure 4, however, reveals that four other regions exist where the convergence is not guaranteed for all
c ∈ (0, 1].
39Introducing stochasticity into the model by having the monopolist forming expectations about the
evolution of exogenous parameters is an extension that we leave for future research.
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sumer products considerably underestimated their market potential (including photo-
graphic cameras, which were supposed to be limited to a small cadre of professional
portrait takers, and computers, which IBM thought to be limited to massive processing
operations). Yet other products unexpectedly became destined to leave the market
(such as typewriters and gas lamps) due to the emergence of a superior technology
(computerized word processing and electric lamps respectively). We thus illustrate how
unexpected changes in exogenous parameters can be incorporated into the model by
examining unexpected changes in demand, as reflected in changes of A (examining
unexpected changes in other exogenous parameters would be likewise incorporated).
Suppose the monopolist is confronted with some initial marginal cost c0 such that
Region I applies. If c0 > cˆ for a given set of parameters, the development of this
technology is unprofitable. However, a sufficient increase in A, which increases the
profit potential of a technology, can then lead to a situation whereby c0 < cˆ (recall from
Figure 7 that cˆ is increasing in A); an unprofitable development project has turned into
a profitable one. The firm then follows the stable path to the saddle-point steady state.
Once the firm is following the stable path, any upward move in A pushes the firm onto
the stable path characterized by larger R&D efforts k for all c and a lower long-run
steady-state value of marginal cost.
Alternatively, there is a sudden drop in A because, for instance, a new and superior
technology is entering the market. And suppose this drop is large enough to bring us
to Region IV (where the exit trajectory is globally optimal). This situation is depicted
in Figure 12. The final value of marginal costs on the stable path before the parameter
change (c1) translates into a new “initial value” of marginal costs (c2) on the exit
trajectory corresponding to the value of parameters after the change in A. From the
point of the change onwards, the monopolist follows the exit trajectory and eventually
exits the market.40
40If the fall in A is large, it can well happen that after the change marginal cost exceeds the choke
price (c2 > 1) such that production and R&D are terminated immediately. Alternatively, if the drop in A
is sufficiently small, such that for c2 the stable path is still optimal, the firm follows the new stable path
characterized by lower k for all c and higher long-run steady-state marginal cost.
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Figure 12: An unexpected fall in the demand parameter A. The upper trajectory (stable
path) is drawn for (ρ, φ) = (1, 8). Beginning in the area with zero production, the firm
starts investing along the stable path (W1) and after some time also producing (W2).
The vertical dashed line indicates the moment at which a sudden fall in A occurs. For
the new value of parameters (ρ, φ) = (1, 3), the firm starts following the exit trajectory
(W3).
4.5 Welfare analysis
In this section, we highlight one particular insight from our model. Recall that the
level of marginal cost at the indifference point (the marginal cost level for which the
monopolist is indifferent between developing the technology further and opting out) is
positively related to the profit potential of the new technology (see the discussion in
relation to Figure 7). Figure 13 (panel (a)) shows the total discounted value of total
surplus along the monopolist’s optimal trajectory for two situations: a relatively high
profit potential (black curve), and a lower profit potential (grey curve). Total surplus is
only positive for all initial marginal cost below the indifference point (obviously, when
there is no production, there is no surplus). The figure illustrates an implication of our
analysis: market characteristics that influence future production affect the decision of
the monopolist to develop a new technology. In particular, if market regulations are such
that future mark-ups are reduced, for instance because the monopolist is forced to price
closer to its marginal cost, the range of initial technologies that it is profitable to develop
shrinks (cˆ2 < cˆ1). The loss of total surplus that this reduced range brings about is a
hidden cost of competition policies if the indifference point is above c = 1, as in that
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Figure 13: Panel (a) shows the total discounted value of total surplus for (ρ, φ) = (1, 8)
(black) and (ρ, φ) = (1, 7) (grey). Panel (b) shows total discounted profits (thin solid
curve), consumer surplus (dotted curve) and total surplus (thick solid curve) along the
stable path for different initial values of marginal costs. Beyond the indifference point
cˆ ≈ 1.49, total profits are negative, but consumer surplus and total surplus are positive.
(ρ, φ) = (1, 8).
case, initially there is no production. Hence, not developing the technology does not
surface as an immediate reduction in total surplus. Indeed, for a proper assessment of
the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency these hidden costs should be taken
into account.
As an illustration, consider first Figure 13, panel (b). It displays total discounted
profits, consumer surplus and total surplus along the stable path of the saddle steady
state, in case the indifference point is in the region of zero production. Note that there
is a small range of initial marginal cost, just above the indifference point, that would
induce the monopolist to abandon the technology at the cost of giving up consumer
surplus (and hence, total surplus). Likewise, Figure 14 compares total discounted profits
and total surplus along the stable path and the exit trajectory (up to their respective
conjugate points; see footnote 30) when the indifference point is in the region of positive
production. In this case, total surplus on the stable path between cˆ1 and cˆ2 is higher than
on the exit trajectory (the trajectory chosen by the monopolist; see also the discussion of
Figure 8). In both these cases the monopolist gives up on development ‘too early’; had
it chosen the stable path (rather than not developing the technology at all, or choosing
the exit trajectory), more surplus would have been generated. As is well known, this
discrepancy between the private and social indifference point is caused by the inability
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Figure 14: Total discounted profits (thin) and total surplus (thick) along the stable path
(solid) and the exit trajectory (dashed) when the indifference point is in the region of
positive production; (ρ, φ) = (1, 5).
of the monopolist to appropriate the entire surplus it generates by its R&D activities.41
What is revealed by our analysis, however, is that the cost of this discrepancy can remain
hidden if the decision of the monopolist affects production that has not been started yet.
5 Concluding remarks
Existing models of R&D are difficult to reconcile with empirical aspects of R&D. These
include the observation that many initial technologies (“prototypes” or “ideas”) need
to be developed further before they can enter the market, that only a minority of initial
technologies is successfully brought to the market, that production starts only after
an initial stage during which the technology is developed further, and that process
innovations are implemented for technologies that are destined to leave the market.
In this paper, we have developed a dynamic model of R&D that describes the R&D
investment decision of a monopolist, and that is better aligned with these empirical
observations.
A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we provide a global analysis, as
opposed to all related papers. Accordingly, we do not limit initial technologies to carry
41Simulating the model over a wide range of parameter configurations, we never encountered a case with
a social indifference point lower than the monopolist’s one.
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marginal costs that are below the choke price. The part of the parameter space for which
such technologies could eventually lead to the saddle-point steady state is not negligible
indeed. More generally, we have shown that there always exists a critical value of initial
marginal cost above which the firm does not initiate any (R&D) activity; the stable path
of the saddle-point steady state is never globally optimal.
Our analysis suggests a careful look at competition policies that reduce mark-ups in
products markets. Reduced future profits diminish the profitability to develop further
initial technologies, in particular those that come with marginal costs above the choke
price. Not developing further these technologies does not surface as a cost of competition
policy as there is no production yet that will be taken from the market. Obviously, a
proper assessment of a competition policies requires an analysis that includes firm
competition, an exercise that is part of our future research agenda.
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 1
A rescaled variable or parameter is distinguished by a tilde: for instance, if pi denotes
profit, then p˜i denotes profit in rescaled variables. The profit function in the original
(non-rescaled) model is:
pi = (A− q − c) q − bk2 (A.1)
Using the conversion rules given in Lemma 1, we obtain:
pi = (A− q − c) q − bk2
= (A−Aq˜ −Ac˜)Aq˜ − b
(
A√
b
k˜
)2
= A2
(
(1− q˜ − c˜) q˜ − k˜2
)
= A2p˜i
The equation for the evolution of marginal cost over time is in original variables given
by:
c˙(t) = c(t) (−k(t) + δ) . (A.2)
Write c(t) = c
(
1
δ t˜
)
. Then
dc
dt˜
=
dc
dt
dt
dt˜
=
c˙
δ
=
(
1− 1
δ
k
)
c.
Setting k = A√
b
k˜ and substituting it in the previous equation, we obtain:
dc
dt˜
=
(
1− A
δ
√
b
k˜
)
c.
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It is now natural to introduce φ = A
δ
√
b
.
Note that if c˜ = c/A, then ˙˜c = c˙/A and
˙˜c =
(
1− φk˜
)
c˜
Observe finally that if t = t˜δ , then e
−ρ˜t˜ = e−ρt if and only if ρ˜ = ρδ .
B Proof of Lemma 2
As ρ > 0, the equilibrium condition k˙ = ρk = 0 implies that k = 0. But then
c˙ = c (1− φk) = c. This is equal to 0 if, and only if, c = 0. But this cannot be, as in
the system with zero production we have c ≥ 1.
C Proof of Proposition 1
Assume φ > 4
√
ρ. The stability of the steady states can be analyzed by evaluating the
trace and determinant of the following Jacobian matrix:42
JM =
 ∂c˙∂c ∂c˙∂k
∂k˙
∂c
∂k˙
∂k
 =
 1− φk −φc
−φ(1−2c)4 ρ
 . (C.1)
At c = k = 0, the trace τ of the matrix JM is given as
τ
def
= tr JM = 1 + ρ > 0,
its determinant ∆ is
∆
def
= det JM = ρ > 0,
42Note that the trace of the respective Jacobian matrix is equal to the sum of eigenvalues, while its
determinant is equal to their product. If the real part of each eigenvalue is negative, then the steady state is
asymptotically stable. If the real part of at least one of the eigenvalues is positive, then the steady state is
unstable. More particular, if one eigenvalue is real and positive and the other one real and negative, the steady
state is said to be a saddle. In this last situation, there are four special trajectories, the separatrices, two of
which are forward asymptotic to the saddle, while the other two are backward asymptotic to it. The union of
the former separatrices with the saddle form the stable manifold of the saddle; analogously, the union of the
latter with the saddle form the unstable manifold.
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and its discriminant D is
D
def
= τ2 − 4∆ = (1− ρ)2 > 0.
Hence, this steady state is an unstable node.
Evaluating the Jacobian matrix at
k =
φ
4ρ
c(1− c), c = 1
2
+ V =
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− 16ρ
φ2
, (C.2)
we obtain τ = ρ > 0 and
∆ =
√
φ2 − 16ρ
[
φ+
√
φ2 − 16ρ
]
8
= φ2V
(
1
4
+
1
2
V
)
, (C.3)
which is clearly positive if φ > 4
√
ρ. Hence, this steady state is also unstable. The
discriminant takes the value
D = ρ(8 + ρ)− 1
2
φ
(
φ+
√
φ2 − 16ρ
)
, (C.4)
which is zero for φ = φ0 =
√
ρ(8+ρ)2
(4+ρ) , negative for φ > φ0, and positive for 4
√
ρ ≤
φ < φ0. The steady state is an unstable node if D > 0 and an unstable focus if D < 0.
In the latter case, the eigenvalues of JM are complex conjugates with positive real
parts.43
Finally, evaluating the Jacobian matrix at
k =
φ
4ρ
c(1− c), c = 1
2
− V = 1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 16ρ
φ2
, (C.5)
we obtain τ = ρ > 0 and
∆ =
φ2 − 16ρ− φ
√
φ2 − 16ρ
8
. (C.6)
If φ > 4
√
ρ, then ∆ < 0, and the eigenvalues are real and have opposite sign. Therefore,
43Note that the eigenvalues of JM are r1,2 = 12
(
τ ±√τ2 − 4∆
)
.
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(C.5) is a saddle-point steady state of the system. Observe that for φ = 4
√
ρ, the two
steady states (C.2) and (C.5) coincide at c = 1/2 and k = 1φ . A saddle-node bifurcation
occurs at these parameter values, where the two equilibria collide and disappear.44
Substituting the expression for the steady-state marginal cost of the steady states
other than the origin into (32), the expression for the optimal investment in the steady
state simplifies to kM = 1φ .
D Proof of Lemma 3
As we deal with both versions of the model, we use tildes in the notation of rescaled
variables and parameters to avoid ambiguity. We first prove the stated relations between
parameters and steady-state values for the rescaled model. Take φ > 4
√
ρ˜, such that the
saddle-point steady state exists. The saddle-point steady state values of the marginal
cost, output, and profit are given in (36)-(38). Consumer surplus and total surplus are,
respectively:
C˜S
M
=
(1− p˜)q˜
2
=
1
2
(q˜M )2 =
1
32
(1 + 2V )
2
, (D.1)
T˜ S
M
= p˜iM + C˜S
M
=
3
32
(1 + 2V )
2 − 1
φ2
. (D.2)
44In Figure 2, this corresponds to the locus c˙ = 0, which is the horizontal line k = 1
φ
, becoming tangent
to the locus k˙ = 0 at its peak.
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Substituting the expression for V given in (35) in the steady state expressions (36)-(38)
and (D.1)-(D.2) and taking appropriate derivatives, we obtain:
∂c˜M
∂φ
= − 8ρ˜
φ2
√
φ2 − 16ρ˜ < 0,
∂c˜M
∂ρ˜
=
4
φ
√
φ2 − 16ρ˜ > 0,
∂q˜M
∂φ
=
4ρ˜
φ2
√
φ2 − 16ρ˜ > 0,
∂q˜M
∂ρ˜
= − 2
φ
√
φ2 − 16ρ˜ < 0,
∂p˜iM
∂φ
=
2
(
1 + ρ˜+ ρ˜φ√
φ2−16ρ˜
)
φ3
> 0,
∂p˜iM
∂ρ˜
= −
1 + φ√
φ2−16ρ˜
φ2
< 0,
∂C˜S
M
∂φ
=
ρ˜+ ρ˜φ√
φ2−16ρ˜
φ3
> 0,
∂C˜S
M
∂ρ˜
= −
1 + φ√
φ2−16ρ˜
2φ2
< 0,
∂T˜S
M
∂φ
=
2 + 3ρ˜+ 3ρ˜φ√
φ2−16ρ˜
φ3
> 0,
∂T˜S
M
∂ρ˜
= −
3 + 3φ√
φ2−16ρ˜
2φ2
< 0.
All inequalities follow straightforwardly form the admissible values of the parameters.
We now prove the stated relations for the original model. Applying the conversion
40
rules defined in Lemma 1, we obtain:
cM =
A−
√
A2 − 16bδρ
2
,
qM =
A+
√
A2 − 16bδρ
4
,
piM =
A2 − 8bδ(δ + ρ) +A
√
A2 − 16bδρ
8
,
CSM =
1
2
(qM )2 =
1
32
(
A+
√
A2 − 16bδρ
)2
,
TSM =
3A2 − 8bδ(2δ + 3ρ) + 3A
√
A2 − 16bδρ
16
.
Take A > 4
√
bδρ, such that the saddle-point steady state exists. Then:
∂cM
∂b
=
4δρ√
A2 − 16bδρ > 0, (D.3)
∂cM
∂δ
=
4bρ√
A2 − 16bδρ > 0, (D.4)
∂qM
∂b
= − 2δρ√
A2 − 16bδρ < 0, (D.5)
∂qM
∂δ
= − 2bρ√
A2 − 16bδρ < 0. (D.6)
It follows from the definition of consumer surplus (CSM = 12
(
qM
)2
) that the effect of
b and δ on CSM is qualitatively the same as their effect on qM . Moreover, we have:
∂piM
∂b
= −δ(δ + ρ)− Aδρ√
A2 − 16bδρ < 0,
∂piM
∂δ
= b
(
−2δ + ρ
(
−1− A√
A2 − 16bδρ
))
< 0,
∂TSM
∂b
=
1
2
δ
(
−2δ + ρ
(
−3− 3A√
A2 − 16bδρ
))
< 0,
∂TSM
∂δ
=
1
2
b
(
−4δ + ρ
(
−3− 3A√
A2 − 16bδρ
))
< 0.
Again, all inequalities follow straightforwardly from the relevant values of the parame-
ters.
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E Proof of Remark 1
The Hessian matrix of the Pontryagin function with respect to control and state variables
is
D2(q,k,c)P =

∂2P (·)
∂q2
∂2P (·)
∂q∂k
∂2P (·)
∂q∂c
∂2P (·)
∂k∂q
∂2P (·)
∂k2
∂2P (·)
∂k∂c
∂2P (·)
∂c∂q
∂2P (·)
∂c∂k
∂2P (·)
∂c2
 =

−2 0 −1
0 −2 −φλ
−1 −φλ 0
 . (E.1)
The leading principal minor of the first order of this matrix is −2. The leading principal
minor of the third order, which is also the determinant, of the above matrix is equal to
2 + 2φ2λ2. As the leading principal minors of odd order do not have the same sign, the
matrix is indefinite. Consequently, the Pontryagin function is nowhere jointly concave
in state and control variables. Hence, the Arrow-Mangasarian sufficiency conditions are
not satisfied.45
F Proof of Lemma 4
To prove the lemma, we consider the state–co-state form of the solution, given by:
c˙ =

c
(
1 + 12φ
2λc
)
, 0 ≤ c < 1, λ ≤ 0;
c, 0 ≤ c < 1, λ > 0;
c
(
1 + 12φ
2λc
)
, c ≥ 1, λ ≤ 0;
c, c ≥ 1, λ > 0;
(F.1)
45For details of sufficiency conditions, see, for instance, Grass et al. (2008).
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λ˙ =

1
2 (1− c) +
(
ρ− 1− 12φ2λc
)
λ, 0 ≤ c < 1, λ ≤ 0;
1
2 (1− c) + (ρ− 1)λ, 0 ≤ c < 1, λ > 0;(
ρ− 1− 12φ2λc
)
λ, c ≥ 1, λ ≤ 0;
(ρ− 1)λ, c ≥ 1, λ > 0;
(F.2)
H(c, λ) =

1
4 (1− c)2 + 14φ2λ2c2 + λc, 0 ≤ c < 1, λ ≤ 0;
1
4 (1− c)2 + λc, 0 ≤ c < 1, λ > 0;
1
4φ
2λ2c2 + λc, c ≥ 1, λ ≤ 0;
λc, c ≥ 1, λ > 0.
(F.3)
Introduce the characteristic function χS of a set S by
χS(x) =

1 if x ∈ S
0 if x /∈ S,
(F.4)
differential equations (F.1) and (F.2) can be rewritten more compactly as:
c˙ = c+ χ(−∞,0](λ)
1
2
φ2λc2
def
= F (c, λ) (F.5)
and
λ˙ = (ρ− 1)λ− χ(−∞,0](λ)1
2
φ2cλ2 + χ[0,1)(c)
1
2
(1− c) def= G(c, λ). (F.6)
The state–co-state space is presented in Figure 15. We first consider the trajectories in
the region where c ≥ 1 and λ > 0, which are the solution to the following canonical
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Figure 15: Illustrative sketch of the state–co-state space (for ρ < 1). The dotted vertical
line c = 1 separates the region with zero production from the region with a positive
level of production, whereas the horizontal line λ = 0 separates the region with positive
investment from the region with zero investment. The loci c˙ = 0 and λ˙ = 0 intersect
in the two unstable steady states (S1 and S3) and the saddle-point steady state S2 (not
indicated). A number of trajectories is indicated by black curves: the arrows point
in the direction of the flow. The thick curve indicates the stable path leading to the
saddle-point steady state.
system: 
c˙ = c,
λ˙ = (ρ− 1)λ,
(F.7)
given by λ(t) = C1e(ρ−1)t and c(t) = C2et, where C1 and C2 are positive constants.
As mentioned in the main text, every candidate for an optimal solution must necessarily
satisfy the transversality condition limt→∞ e−ρtλ(t)c(t) = 0. As we now show, the
trajectories in the region considered violate this condition. Moreover, they also violate
the following transversality condition:46
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtH(c, λ) = 0, (F.8)
46In words, the above condition means that the present value of the maximum of the Pontryagin function
(the present value of the Hamiltonian) converges to zero when time goes to infinity.
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which in this case coincides with the first transversality condition, as shown below. It
follows from Michel (1982) that condition (F.8) is also a necessary condition, and hence
that it allows exclusion of trajectories which verify the other necessary conditions in an
infinite horizon optimization problem. The value of the Hamiltonian function evaluated
along the considered trajectories is H(c, λ) = λ(t)c(t) = C1C2eρt; it follows that
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtH(c, λ) = lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλ(t)c(t) = C1C2 6= 0. (F.9)
Hence, no trajectory in the region given by the restrictions c ≥ 1 and λ > 0 can be
optimal.
Consider now trajectories in the region with 0 < c < 1 and λ > 0. These trajectories
are the solution to 
c˙ = c,
λ˙ = 12 (1− c) + (ρ− 1)λ.
(F.10)
We show that any trajectory in this region sooner or later enters the region with c ≥ 1
and λ > 0.
Observe that the equation c˙ = c has as solution c(t) = C3et, where C3 is a positive
constant. Hence, along any trajectory in this region, c is increasing. From (F.2) follows
that if λ = 0, then
λ˙ =
1
2
(1− c) > 0
for all c ∈ (0, 1). Hence, trajectories in the region with 0 < c < 1 and λ > 0 cannot
exit this region through the line segment {(c, λ) : c ∈ (0, 1), λ = 0}.
We now show that they also cannot exit through the point (c, λ) = (1, 0).47 Let
x = (c, λ) and x0 = (c0, λ0) = (1, 0). Furthermore, let F : D → R2 be a vector
function defined as
F(c, λ) =
(
F (c, λ), G(c, λ)
)
,
where F is defined in (F.5) and G in (F.6).48 Its domain is D = R+ × R ⊂ R2. We are
47If they exited through this point, they would satisfy the transversality conditions as λ˙ = 0 for λ = 0
and c ≥ 1.
48Though continuous, functions F and G are not differentiable: F is not differentiable with respect to
λ at λ = 0, whereas G is not differentiable with respect to c at c = 1. Using Peano’s existence theorem,
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then looking for a solution to a 2-dimensional nonlinear autonomous dynamical system
of the form
x˙ = F(x), x(0) = x0. (F.11)
Take 0 < r < 1. Then the set
D0 = Br(x0) = {x ∈ D : ‖x− x0‖ ≤ r}, (F.12)
is a neighborhood of x0. First, we show that the restriction of the functions F and G on
D0 (a compact subset of D) is Lipschitz.49 Consider first the function
F (c, λ) = c+ λχ(−∞,0](λ)
φ2c2
2
.
Write for brevity χ = χ(−∞,0] and set h(λ) = χ(λ)λ. Then,
|h(λ)− h(0)| = |χ(λ)λ− 0| = |χ(λ)λ| ≤ |λ| = 1 · |λ− 0|. (F.13)
Hence, h is Lipschitz on D0. As on compact sets continuously differentiable functions
are Lipschitz, as well as sums and products of Lipschitz functions, it follows that F is
Lipschitz on D0.
Consider now on D0 the function
G = (ρ− 1)λ− λ2χ(−∞,0](λ)φ
2c
2
+
1− c
2
χ[0,1)(c).
The first term of this expression is a linear function; the second term is the function h
introduced above times a differentiable function. That the final term is Lipschitz at c = 1
is demonstrated in the same way as for the function h. It follows that G is Lipschitz
on D0.
We have proved that the functions F andG are locally Lipschitz at x0. Consequently,
the continuity of F implies that at least one solution to (F.11) exists. However, continuity is not enough to
guarantee uniqueness. An additional condition that needs to be fulfilled to guarantee uniqueness of solutions,
at least in some neighborhood of x0, is that F is locally Lipschitz in x at x0.
49Simply put, a function f : D → Rn is said to be Lipschitz on B ⊆ D if there exists a constant K > 0
such that ‖f(x)− f(y)‖ ≤ K‖x− y‖, for all x, y ∈ B. See Kelley and Peterson (2010), ch. 8, and Sohrab
(2003), ch. 4, for the introduction to concepts and precise definitions of terms used in this section.
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so is the vector function F. By the Picard-Lindelo¨f Theorem, the system (F.11) has a
unique solution in a neighborhood of x0. As this point is on the exit trajectory, no other
trajectory can pass through it, in particular no trajectory from the region with λ > 0.
As c˙ > 0 in the region with 0 < c < 1 and λ > 0, as shown above, all trajectories in
this region exit through {c = 1, λ > 0} and enter the region with c ≥ 1 and λ > 0 as
t→∞. We have already shown that none of these can be optimal.
Moreover, trajectories through points in the set {(c, λ) : c ∈ (0, 1), λ = 0} sat-
isfy λ˙ > 0; they move in the region for which λ > 0 and hence cannot be a part of any
optimal trajectory. Due to a one-to-one correspondence between λ and k as given in
the first part of (21), this set corresponds to the set {(c, k) : c ∈ (0, 1), k = 0} in the
state-control representation of the solution. As we have shown, all trajectories leading
to these points violate the transversality conditions which every optimal trajectory must
necessarily satisfy.
G Proof of Lemma 5
Assume that there is an optimal investment schedule for which c → 0 and k → ∞
as t→∞.
The instantaneous profit function of the firm reads as
pi = (1− q − c)q − k2. (G.1)
As c→ 0 along the trajectories considered, they sooner or later enter the region with
positive production, where we have q = (1 − c)/2. Substituting this expression into
(G.1), we obtain:
pi =
(1− c)2
4
− k2. (G.2)
As c→ 0, (1− c)2/4 approaches its upper bound of 1/4. The second term in the above
equation, −k2, decreases beyond all bounds as k →∞. As t→∞, there is therefore a
time t0 such that pi(t) = 0 for t = t0, and pi(t) < 0 for all t > t0.
Changing the investment schedule to k(t) = 0 for all t ≥ t0 would yield a higher
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value of total discounted profits Π, contradicting the assumption.
H Proof of Lemma 6
We know that the state-control system with zero production is:
k˙(t) = ρk(t),
c˙(t) = c(t) (1− φk(t)) .
At k = 0, this reduces to: k˙(t) = 0, c˙(t) = c. Hence, marginal costs increase to
infinity along the exit trajectory as t → ∞. However, as λ = 0 for c ≥ 1 along the
exit trajectory, the transversality condition (17) is satisfied. Observe that along the exit
trajectory k > 0 for 0 < c < 1 and k = 0 for c ≥ 1. Consequently, it follows from
(21) that λ = 0 at c = 1. Then, from (F.2) we have that indeed λ = 0 for all c ≥ 1.
Increasing marginal costs along the exit trajectory sooner or later exceed the value
of 1, for which the value of H(c, λ) becomes 0 (see (F.3)). Hence, the transversality
condition (16) is satisfied as well.
I Proof of Corollary 1
In this appendix, we prove that the only candidates for an optimal solution curve are
the stable path of the saddle-point steady state and the exit trajectory. In particular,
we show that any solution curve of the state-control system, given in (26) and (28)
and depicted in Figure 2, starting at a point (c0, k0) with c0, k0 > 0 either (i) ends
on the stable path, (ii) ends on the exit trajectory, (iii) gives rise to a control k(t) that
goes to infinity, and then satisfies the condition of Lemma 5, or (iv) passes through
the line segment {(c, k) : c ∈ (0, 1), k = 0}, and is then excluded as an optimal
solution by Lemma 4. We note that the vector field defined by the state-control system
is always locally Lipschitz, and that therefore the theorem of existence and uniqueness
of trajectories through a given initial point holds.
There are two situations, determined by the location of the maximum ( 12 , k
∗) of the
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k˙ = 0 isocline which is the quadratic function c 7→ φ4ρc(1 − c). In the first situation
k∗ ≥ 1/φ, in the second k∗ < 1/φ.
If k∗ ≥ 1/φ, the state-control space S = {(c, k) : c > 0, k > 0} can be partitioned
in three regions S1, S2, and S3. The first set is defined as follows:
S1 = {(c, k) : 0 < c < 1, k > k∗},
where k∗ = φ/(16ρ) is the maximum of c 7→ φ4ρc(1 − c). To define the second
set, we note that the trajectory γ of the state-control space that passes through the
point (c, k) = (1, φ/(16ρ)), when continued backwards in time, necessarily has a
second intersection with the line c = 1. The first of these intersections, as time
decreases, is denoted (c, k) = (1, k∗), where 0 < k∗ < 1/φ. Let D be the region
bounded by γ and the line c = 1. Then,
S2 = {(c, k) : c ≥ 1, k > 0}\D.
Finally,
S3 = S\(S1 ∪ S2).
From the state-control equations
c˙ = c(1− φk), k˙ = ρk − φ
4
c(1− c),
and the fact that k∗ > 1/φ, it follows that everywhere in S1 we have c˙ < 0 and k˙ > 0.
It follows by Lemma 5 that no trajectory in this region can be optimal.
In region S2, the state-control equations read as
c˙ = c(1− φk), k˙ = ρk.
We claim that every trajectory in this region must leave it through the half-line `1 =
{(c, k) : c = 1, k ≥ k∗}. Note first that the boundary of S2 consists of `1, the curve γ,
the line segment `2 = {(c, k) : c = 1, 0 < k ≤ k∗}, and the half-line `3 = {(c, k) :
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c ≥ 1, k = 0}. As γ and `3 are parts of trajectories of the state-control system, no
trajectories can leave S2 through them. Moreover, we have c˙ ≥ 0 on `2, so exit through
this part of the boundary is also impossible. The remaining possibilities are to leave
through `1, as claimed, or to remain in S2 indefinitely.
To show that the latter alternative is impossible, note that since k˙ = ρk, any
trajectory in S2 will eventually satisfy k > 2/φ. But then c˙ < −c, and this implies that
eventually c should satisfy c = 1, leaving the region S2 towards S1. As no trajectory
in S1 can be optimal, this now extends to all trajectories in S2.
It remains to analyze the trajectories in S3. They can leave that region through the
line segments `2, `4 = {(c, k) : 0 < c < 1, k = 0} or `5 = {(c, k) : 0 < c < 1, k =
k∗}, as the remaining parts of the boundary are trajectories of the state-control system,
or through the point (1, 0) on the exit trajectory.
Trajectories leaving through `2 enter S2 and therefore cannot be optimal. As
noted above, trajectories leaving through `4 are excluded by Lemma 4 from optimality.
Trajectories leaving through `5 enter S1 and again cannot be optimal. Of all the
trajectories leaving S3, only those on the exit trajectory are thus candidates for optimal
solutions.
It remains to discuss the trajectories that remain in S3 for all time. By the Poincare´-
Bendixon theorem, since S3 is bounded, the limit set of such a trajectory is either a
steady-state point or a closed curve. The latter possibility can be ruled out as the area
enclosed by the curve would be invariant (cf. Wagener, 2003). The only steady state
in S3 that can be approached by a trajectory is the saddle, if k∗ > 1/φ, or the semi-stable
steady state, if k∗ = 1/φ, and this shows the result.
If k∗ < 1/φ, the situation is much simpler. Define in that case
S1 = {(c, k) : 0 < c < 1, k > 1/φ},
S2 = {(c, k) : c ≥ 1, k > 0},
S3 = S\(S1 ∪ S2).
As above, points in S1 cannot be optimal as a consequence of Lemma 5; points in S2
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eventually end up in S1 and are excluded by the same reasoning; and as there are no
saddle points in S3 and the trajectories leaving through `4 cannot be optimal, the only
remaining candidate is the exit trajectory.
J Proof of Lemma 8
From (31), we know that the Hamiltonian for c ≥ 1 is given by:
H(c, k) = k
(
k − 2
φ
)
; (J.1)
and from Lemma 7, we know that the comparison of the total discounted profits of
each two candidate optimal paths amounts to comparing the values of the respective
Hamiltonians in the initial point of each respective path. As the Hamiltonian in the case
of zero investment and zero production is zero, the indifference point between the stable
path and the exit trajectory in the region with zero production must be the point at which
the Hamiltonian evaluated along the stable path obtains the value of zero.
H(c, k) = k
(
k − 2φ
)
= 0
⇒ k = 0 or k = 2φ
The solution structure (39)-(40) tells us that the stable path in the region with
c ≥ 1 decreases as t→ −∞, assuming that the stable path covers the respective region.
Observe that the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to k is ∂H(c,k)∂k = 2
(
k − 1φ
)
,
which is positive for k > 1/φ and negative for k < 1/φ.
If the stable path enters the region with zero production at all, it enters this region at
the point where k > 1φ ; this follows directly from equation (28).
The same equation implies that k is decreasing along the stable path as t→ −∞,
assuming the stable path enters the zero-production region. The above conclusions lead
us to distinguish three cases. First, if the stable path crosses the boundary line c = 1
at k > 2φ , then the value of the Hamiltonian is decreasing along the stable path in the
region with c ≥ 1 as t → −∞, passes zero at k = 2φ and is negative afterwards. In
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this case, the indifference point is the value of the marginal cost cˆ > 1 that corresponds
to the point
(
cˆ, 2φ
)
on the stable path. Second, if the stable path reaches c = 1 at
exactly k = 2φ , then the indifference point is c = 1. Third, for lower values of k on the
stable path at c = 1, the value of the Hamiltonian evaluated along the stable path in the
zero-production region is negative, such that the point of indifference (if at all) must be
in the region with positive production.
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